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ABSTRACT 
Many popular blockchain platforms are supporting smart 
contracts for building decentralized applications. However, the 
vulnerabilities within smart contracts have led to serious financial 
loss to their end users. For the EOSIO blockchain platform, 
effective vulnerability detectors are still limited. Furthermore, 
existing vulnerability detection tools can only support one 
blockchain platform. In this work, we present WANA, a cross-
platform smart contract vulnerability detection tool based on the 
symbolic execution of WebAssembly bytecode. Furthermore, 
WANA proposes a set of test oracles to detect the vulnerabilities 
in EOSIO and Ethereum smart contracts based on WebAssembly 
bytecode analysis. Our experimental analysis shows that WANA 
can effectively detect vulnerabilities in both EOSIO and 
Ethereum smart contracts with high efficiency. 
CCS CONCEPTS 
• Security and privacy → Software and application security 
• Software and its engineering → Software verification and 
validation 
KEYWORDS 
Symbolic execution, WebAssembly, Smart contract, Wasm, 
Vulnerability detection, EOSIO, Ethereum  
1 Introduction  
The blockchain technology has enabled decentralized value 
transfer networks among parties with limited trust [14]. With the 
support of smart contracts, the developers can build Decentralized 
Applications (DApps) on top of the blockchain platforms such 
that untrusted parties can cooperate with each other. Popular 
DApps include blockchain games, Decentralized Finance (DeFi), 
online gambling, decentralized exchanges, wallets, supply chain 
management, logistics tracking, etc.  
The Ethereum [4] and EOSIO [28] are two of the most popular 
public blockchain platforms supporting smart contracts. However, 
the vulnerabilities within Ethereum and EOSIO smart contracts 
have led to financial loss to their end users. For EOSIO smart 
contracts, the Block Information Dependency vulnerability, the 
Fake EOS Transfer vulnerability and the Forged Transfer 
Notification vulnerability have led to the loss of around 380K 
EOS tokens [31][33] in total. The accumulated amount of loss by 
these vulnerabilities was around 1.9 million worth of USD at the 
time of attack. For the Ethereum smart contracts, the vulnerability 
in the DAO contract [22] led to the loss of $60 million. Also, the 
Freezing Ether and the Dangerous DelegateCall Vulnerability 
resulted in the loss of $60 million and the frozen of $150 million 
in terms of Ether [41][42], respectively.  
Therefore, effective vulnerability detection tools are needed to 
safeguard the ecosystem of blockchain platform. However, the 
vulnerability detection tools for EOSIO smart contract are still 
limited. Furthermore, existing smart contract vulnerability 
detection tools can only support one blockchain platform. Due to 
the diversity of blockchain platforms, a cross-platform 
vulnerability detection tool is desirable for practical use.  
WebAssembly (Wasm for short) [42] is a binary instruction 
format for a stack-based virtual machine. It is also adopted by the 
EOSIO blockchain platform for better efficiency and reliability. 
The Ethereum also plans to replace the EVM with Ethereum 
WebAssembly (EWasm) VM as the smart contract execution 
engine for Ethereum 2.0 [12][18]. As a result, the smart contracts 
on both the EOSIO and Ethereum platform will be compiled to 
WebAssembly for execution in the corresponding Wasm VM 
implementation. Therefore, a symbolic execution engine at the 
WebAssembly level has the potential to provide a common 
security analysis framework for EOSIO smart contract, Ethereum 
smart contract, and even for Web applications based on Wasm.  
In this work, we proposed WANA, a symbolic execution 
engine for Wasm bytecode to support cross-platform 
vulnerability ANAlysis. WANA can support the vulnerability 
detection of both EOSIO and Ethereum smart contracts. In our 
experiment on about 3960 EOSIO smart contracts, WANA 
effectively detected more than 400 vulnerabilities. Furthermore, 
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our case study showed that WANA can also effectively detect 3 
typical vulnerabilities for Ethereum smart contracts. 
The contribution of this work is three-fold. First, it presents 
the first cross-platform smart contract vulnerability detection 
framework based on the symbolic execution of Wasm bytecode. 
Second, it proposes a set of test oracles to detect the 
vulnerabilities within EOSIO and Ethereum smart contracts based 
on Wasm bytecode analysis. Third, the work has evaluated 
WANA on both EOSIO and Ethereum smart contracts for 
vulnerability detection, and WANA has effectively identified 
vulnerabilities in both EOSIO and Ethereum smart contracts with 
high efficiency. 
The organization of the remaining sections is as follows. In 
Section 2, we present the basics of Wasm, EOSIO smart contracts 
and Ethereum smart contracts. Then in Section 3, we review 
typical vulnerabilities of EOSIO and Ethereum smart contracts. 
In Section 4, we present the design of our WANA framework in 
detail. After that, we report a comprehensive experimental study 
to evaluate the effectiveness of WANA in terms of vulnerability 
detection on EOSIO smart contracts in Section 5. Then we present 
a case study to evaluate the vulnerability detection ability of 
WANA on Ethereum smart contracts in Section 6. In Section 7, 
we present successful attacks to smart contracts detected by 
WANA. Finally, in Section 8 and Section 9, we present the related 
works and conclusions. 
2 Background on Wasm and Smart Contracts 
In this section, we will briefly review background information 
on Wasm and smart contracts. 
2.1 The WebAssembly 
WebAssembly (Wasm for short) [42][43] is a binary 
instruction format for a stack-based virtual machine. The 
WebAssembly virtual machines can be embedded into Web 
browsers or Blockchain platforms for execution. Wasm is 
currently supported by the EOSIO blockchain platform. And the 
replacement of Ethereum VM (EVM) with Ethereum Wasm VM  
is planned to take place in Ethereum 2.0 [12][18].  
Wasm is designed as a portable target for compilation of high-
level languages like C/C++/Rust, enabling deployment on the 
web for client and server applications. Wasm is designed to be 
fast, safe, and debugging friendly. As a result, Wasm is widely 
supported by all major web browsers [42]. There are two 
equivalent and convertible representations for WebAssembly: the 
binary format (“.wasm” as suffix) and the text format (“.wast” as 
suffix). The Wasm code is used for execution while the Wast code 
is for ease of reading and editing by human. 
2.2 Background on EOSIO Smart Contracts 
EOSIO [23] is a public blockchain platform that focuses on 
the scalability of transactions. The EOSIO platform uses the 
Delegated Proof of Stake (DPoS) consensus protocol which is 
much more scalable than the Proof of Work (PoW) consensus 
protocol. The EOS token also represents the stake hold by its 
owners. The EOSIO platform supports smart contracts to enable 
developers to build DApps.  
On the EOSIO platform, there are two types of smart contracts. 
The first type is the system contracts, which are smart contracts 
deployed on the EOSIO platform by default to realize core 
blockchain features such as consensus, fee schedules, account 
creation, and token economics [39]. The eosio.token smart 
contract [30] is one such system smart contract which defines the 
data structures and actions enabling users to issue and transfer 
tokens on EOSIO based blockchains. The second type of smart 
contracts are user defined smart contracts deployed on the EOSIO 
platform [36] to realize specific business requirements. 
Each EOSIO smart contract must realize the apply function as 
the entry function to handle actions. All incoming actions are 
routed to the apply function [26], which will in turn dispatch the 
actions to corresponding handler functions for processing. To 
develop EOSIO smart contract, the recommended language is 
C++ [28]. The smart contract in C++ will be compiled into Wasm 
bytecode for execution on the EOSIO Wasm VM. The apply 
function has several parameters as input: receiver, code, and 
action. The receiver is the account currently processing the action. 
The code is the account that the action was originally sent to. The 
action is the id of the action. When a smart contract receives an 
action, it may forward the action to other contracts with the 
require_recipient() function. 
2.3 Background on Ethereum Smart Contracts 
On the Ethereum blockchain platform, there are external 
accounts (i.e., owned by human) and smart contract accounts [33]. 
Smart contract is responsible to manage the balance and the 
persistent private storage of the contract account. A transaction is 
a message sent from one account to another account. 
Conceptually, Ethereum [31] can be viewed as a transaction-
based state machine, where its state is updated on each transaction. 
When the target account of a transaction is a smart contract 
account, its code is executed and the payload is provided as input. 
In existing releases of Ethereum, the smart contract code is 
executed on the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM). Developers 
can write smart contracts using Solidity, a high-level 
programming language [37], which are then compiled into EVM 
bytecode. In the upcoming releases of Ethereum 2.0, EWasm VM 
is planned to replace EVM to serve as the smart contract 
execution engine [12][18]. In particular, EWasm is a restricted 
subset of Wasm to be used for contracts in Ethereum. For example, 
it eliminates non-deterministic behaviors during smart contract 
execution. 
3 Smart Contracts Vulnerabilities 
In this section, we will review smart contract vulnerabilities 
in EOSIO and Ethereum blockchain platforms.  
3.1 EOSIO Smart Contract Vulnerabilities 
We will present 3 typical EOSIO smart contract 
vulnerabilities detected by WANA in this section. 
3.1.1 Fake EOS Transfer 
In the EOSIO platform, a smart contract must send EOS 
tokens to another smart contract via the eosio.token system smart 
contract. The eosio.token system smart contract manages the EOS 
 accounts of all smart contracts within its internal storage. During 
a transfer, the sender contract must call the transfer function of 
eosio.token system contract. Within the transfer function of 
eosio.token, the balances of the sender and receiver contract 
accounts will be adjusted accordingly. Meanwhile, eosio.token 
will call require_recipient() to notify both the sender and receiver 
contracts when performing the transfer.  
Within the apply function of a safe smart contract, it must 
ensure the original receiver (i.e., the code parameter of apply 
function) of the transfer action is eosio.token. However, if the 
contract under attack is vulnerable in that it does not check 
whether the code is eosio.token within its apply function when the 
action is transfer, an attacker may perform an inline call to its 
transfer function directly to fake an EOS transfer. As a result, the 
vulnerable contract may wrongly consider that the attacker has 
transferred EOS to it. The EOSBet [24] and EOSCast [25] are two 
such contracts with Fake EOS Transfer vulnerability, and both 
have suffered serious losses. 
 
1 #define EOSIO_ABI_EX( TYPE, MEMBERS ) 
2 extern "C" { 
3 void apply(uint64_t receiver, uint64_t code, uint64_t action){ 
4 auto self = receiver; 
5 if (code == self || code == N(eosio.token) || action == N(onerror)){ 
6 TYPE thiscontract (self); 
7 switch( action ) { 
8 EOSIO_API(TYPE, MEMBERS) 
9 }}}} 
Figure 1. The EOSBet Contract with Fake EOS Transfer 
Vulnerability 
 
As shown in Figure 1, within the apply function of the EOSBet 
contract, it only checks whether the code is the contract itself or 
eosio.token (line 5), but it does not check whether the code is 
eosio.token when the action is transfer. As a result, an attacker 
contract may directly call the transfer function of the vulnerable 
contract to make a bet without spending any EOS. 
As shown in Figure 2, the best practice to fix the vulnerability 
is to add a check in the apply function to ensure the transfer is 
performed via the eosio.token system contract (lines 6 and 7). In 
other words, when the action is transfer, the code must be 
eosio.token. 
 
1 #define EOSIO_ABI_EX( TYPE, MEMBERS ) 
2 extern "C" { 
3 void apply(uint64_t receiver, uint64_t code, uint64_t action){ 
4 auto self = receiver; 
5 if( code == self || code == N(eosio.token) || action == N(onerror)){ 
6 if( action == N(transfer) ){ 
7 eosio_assert( code == N(eosio.token), "Must transfer EOS"); 
8 } 
9 … 
Figure 2. The Fix of the Fake EOS Transfer Vulnerability 
3.1.2 Forged Transfer Notification 
During a Forged Transfer Notification attack [23], the attacker 
controls two accounts: sender and notifier. The sender initializes 
the attack by transferring EOS to notifier via eosio.token. When 
the transfer is successful, both sender and notifier will receive 
transfer notification. However, the smart contract with account 
notifier can deliberately forward the transfer action to a victim 
contract C with the require_recipient() function, which is 
essentially a carbon copy of the transfer action. 
As shown in Figure 3, if the contract C fails to check whether 
the destination (i.e., data.to) of EOS transfer is itself within its 
transfer function, it may wrongly consider that it has actually 
received EOS from the sender rather than just a notification. As a 
result, it may wrongly credit the sender account, which in fact has 
sent nothing to C. The smart contract C is said to have the Forged 
Transfer Notification vulnerability [32]. 
 
1 class C : public eosio::contract { 
2 public: 
3 void transfer(uint64_t sender, uint64_t receiver) { 
4 auto data = unpack_action_data<st_transfer>(); 
5 if (data.from == _self) //no check for data.to 
6 return; 
7 doSomething(); 
8 } 
9 } 
Figure 3. The Smart Contract with Forged Transfer Notification 
Vulnerability 
As shown in Figure 4, a possible fix of the Forged Transfer 
Notification vulnerability is to check the destination of the 
transfer (line 5). If the destination of the EOS transfer is not the 
current contract, then the contract should directly ignore the 
transfer notification.  
1 class C : public eosio::contract { 
2 public: 
3 void transfer (uint64_t sender, uint64_t receiver) { 
4 auto data = unpack_action_data<st_transfer>(); 
5 if (data.from == _self  || data.to != _self) 
6 return; 
7 doSomething(); 
8 } 
9 } 
Figure 4. A Fix of the Forged Transfer Notification Vulnerability  
3.1.3 Block Information Dependency 
Reliable source of randomness is hard to obtain on blockchain 
platforms. Developers may be tempted to use the block 
information such as tapos_block_prefix and tapos_block_num to 
generate random numbers. The random numbers may be used to 
determine the transfer of EOS or the winner of a lottery. 
Unfortunately, the tapos_block_prefix and tapos_block_num are 
not reliable source of randomness because they can be directly 
calculated from ref_block_num, which is the id of the last 
irreversible block by default. A gambling contract may use a 
deferred action to determine the winner of a lottery. In such 
scenario, the reference block is the block just before the block 
making the bet. Therefore, when a smart contract uses 
tapos_block_prefix and tapos_block_num directly for random 
number generation, the number generated can be predicted.  
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EOSRoyale [31] is an EOSIO smart contract with Block 
Information Dependency vulnerability. As shown in Figure 5, it 
uses the product of the block number and block prefix as the seed 
for random number generation (lines 7 to 9). Therefore, the 
variables used for random number generation can be computed 
before making the bet. As a result, the attackers successfully 
calculated the random number, won the gambling game, and 
received the prizes in EOS. 
1 class EOSRoyale: public eosio::contract { 
2 … 
3 void rand() { 
5 checksum256 result; 
7 auto mixedBlock = tapos_block_prefix()* tapos_block_num(); 
8 const char * mixedChar = (const char *)(&mixedBlock); 
9 sha256((char*)mixedChar, sizeof(mixedChar), &result); 
10 }        
11 } 
Figure 5. The EOSRoyale Contract with Block Information             
Dependency Vulnerability 
3.2 Ethereum Smart Contract Vulnerabilities 
The Ethereum smart contract vulnerabilities 
[2][6][7][8][10][11][15][16][21] have been extensively studied in 
previous works. In this section, we will briefly review three 
common types of Ethereum smart contract vulnerabilities 
supported by WANA. 
Greedy. A greedy smart contract can receive ether but it 
contains no functions to send ether to other accounts. Therefore, 
this kind of smart contract will freeze any ether sent to them. The 
second round of attack on Parity wallet vulnerability [41] was due 
to the fact that many smart contracts only relied on the parity 
wallet library to manage their ether through delegateCall(). When 
the parity library was changed to a contract through initialization 
and then killed by the attacker, all the ether within these wallet 
smart contracts relying on the parity library was frozen. 
Dangerous DelegateCall. The delegatecall is similar to a 
message call except that the code is executed with the data of the 
calling contract [33]. This is the way to implement the “library” 
feature in Solidity for code reuse. However, when the argument 
of the delegatecall is msg.data, an attacker can manipulate the 
msg.data so that the attacker can make a victim contract to call a 
specific function. This vulnerability resulted in the outbreaks of 
the first round of parity wallet attack [40]. The Wallet contract 
used a delegatecall with msg.data as its parameter. As a result, an 
attacker could call any public function of _walletLibrary. Then 
the attacker called the initWallet function of the _walletLibrary 
and became the owner the wallet contract. Finally, the attacker 
sent the ether in the wallet to his own address to finish the attack, 
which led to $30 million loss to the parity wallet users. 
Block Information Dependency. The Block Information 
Dependency vulnerability exists when an Ethereum smart 
contract uses the block timestamp or block number to determine 
a critical operation (e.g., sending ether or determining the winner 
of a lottery). Indeed, both block timestamp and block number are 
variables that can be manipulated by miners, so they cannot be 
used as reliable sources for critical operations. For example, the 
miner has the freedom to set the timestamp of a block within a 
small interval [35] in Ethereum. Therefore, if an Ethereum smart 
contract transfers ether based on timestamp, an attacker can 
manipulate the block timestamp to exploit the vulnerability. 
4 The Design of the WANA Framework 
In this section, we will present the design of the WANA 
symbolic execution framework for cross-platform smart contract 
vulnerability analysis. 
4.1 The Workflow of WANA 
The workflow of WANA is shown in Figure 6. The input of 
WANA is the Wasm bytecode. For EOSIO smart contract, the 
corresponding Wasm bytecode can be collected from the EOSIO 
public blockchain or compiled from EOSIO smart contract source 
code. For Ethereum smart contract written in Solidity, the 
corresponding bytecode can be generated from a solidity-to-
Wasm compiler.  
 
Figure 6 The Workflow of WANA 
First, the Wasm bytecode is parsed, loaded and initialized 
within our Wasm symbolic execution engine. As a result, the 
stack and memory of the symbolic execution engine are ready for 
execution. Second, the symbolic execution engine starts to 
traverse the paths of the Wasm code with symbolic input. During 
symbolic execution, the symbolic execution engine will invoke 
the Z3 [13] constraint solver to check and prune unsatisfiable 
paths along the way. Meanwhile, the execution information useful 
for vulnerability analysis are collected during symbolic execution. 
Third, WANA will perform vulnerability analysis based on the 
execution information collected during the symbolic execution 
process. When a vulnerability is detected, the corresponding 
report will be generated. Note that the step 2 and step 3 are 
iterative process, where the vulnerability analysis and symbolic 
execution will interleave with each other. The whole workflow 
ends when all the code has been traversed.  
Wasm Bytecode
1. Loading & Initialization
Loaded Wasm
3. Vulnerability Analysis
2. Symbolic Execution
Execution Information
Vulnerability Reports
Z3
 4.2 The Symbolic Execution Engine  
Wasm supports 4 data types, including two integer data types 
and two float-point data types under IEEE 754 standard. The 
WANA symbolic execution engine supports all of them for 
analysis. 
WebAssembly programs are organized into modules [34], 
which are the units of deployment, loading, and compilation. For 
an EOSIO or Ethereum smart contract, the generated Wasm 
bytecode will correspond to one module. During the loading and 
initialization phase, the WANA symbolic execution engine will 
prepare the memories, tables, global variables and a stack as the 
execution environment for executing the Wasm instructions 
within a module. For a module, the exports component defines a 
set of exported functions and data structures that become 
accessible to the host environment once the module has been 
instantiated. In other words, the exported functions serve as the 
public interfaces for a Wasm module. Therefore, the WANA 
framework will start the symbolic execution by iterating each 
exported function.  
Among the exported functions, the apply function is the entry 
function to dispatch actions for EOSIO smart contracts. For the 
Ethereum smart contracts, the main function is the entry function 
for interacting with the Ethereum smart contract Application 
Binary Interfaces (ABIs). 
For each Wasm function invocation within the instructions in 
a module, WANA will first prepare a frame as its execution 
context, which includes arguments, local variables, return values, 
and references to its module. Then WANA will start symbolically 
executing the instructions within the code section of the function 
sequentially. The Wasm instructions mainly include the numeric 
instructions, memory instructions, control instructions, and 
function call instructions. WANA has realized 171 out of the 185 
instructions in the WebAssembly specification version 1.0 [42].  
For numeric instructions, WANA realizes the stack-based 
execution logic. The WANA symbolic execution engine will pop 
the operands, perform symbolic calculations, and push the result 
back to stack. All the numeric instructions on integer and floating-
point value types are supported. 
For control instructions, there are two kinds of branch 
instructions: unconditional branch (e.g., br) and conditional 
branch (e.g., br_if). The unconditional branch will directly jump 
to the label specified by the instruction argument to continue 
execution, which is useful to realize loops. However, when the 
depth of the loop grows, the symbolic execution engine may be 
very slow or trapped due to state explosion. Therefore, WANA 
set an upper bound to the depth of loops for each label during path 
exploration. For the instruction br_if, the execution will depend 
on the evaluation results of conditional expression. WANA will 
record the execution context for each branch and traverse each 
branch separately to realize path coverage. For each branch, the 
corresponding path constraint will be input to z3 [13] for 
constraint solving before traversing, which can improve the 
execution efficiency by pruning those infeasible paths.  
There are three types of memory manipulation instructions: 
load, store, and increasing the size of the memory. Wasm adopts 
a linear memory model with a contiguous, mutable array of raw 
bytes [42]. A program can load and store values from/to a linear 
memory at any byte address. Since there are many bit 
manipulation instructions on integer and float data types in Wasm, 
we choose to represent the integer and float data types with the 
bit-vector data type in z3. WANA uses 32-bit (64bit) bit-vector 
data types to represent 32-bit (64-bit) integer and float-point 
symbolic data types. Since byte array cannot store bit-vector and 
its expression, WANA uses a linear list to store the references of 
both concrete and symbolic values to emulate memory. 
In Wasm, there are two types of function calls: direct function 
calls and indirect function calls. For indirect function calls, Wasm 
VM has to first get an index from the top of the stack. Then the 
VM will use the index to get the real function address from a 
function table. There are 3 types of functions for calling directly: 
the other functions of the current Wasm module under analysis, 
the functions of other Wasm modules, the API functions of 
EOSIO. For the functions in the current Wasm module, WANA 
will step into the functions to continue symbolic execution. For 
the API functions or the functions in other modules, WANA still 
cannot support their symbolic executions. Therefore, WANA will 
randomly generate a concrete value based on the return type of 
the function, which may lead to sound but incomplete analysis. 
Modeling the functions in other contracts or the API functions 
may help improve WANA, which we left as a future work.  
4.3 The Vulnerability Detection Algorithm  
In this section, we will present the vulnerability detection 
algorithms for EOSIO and Ethereum smart contracts. 
4.3.1 Vulnerability Detection for EOSIO Smart Contracts 
Fake EOS Transfer. In general, to detect Fake EOS Transfer 
vulnerability, WANA checks whether there is a feasible path with 
code different from eosio.token that finally invokes the transfer 
function within the apply function.  
1 bool isFakeEOSTransfer() { 
2     if apply function is reachable 
3        if the apply function have 3 i64 parameters  
5           find all feasible paths P in apply function where code           is neither equal to eosio.token nor receiver  
6 label the code invoking transfer function as sink 
7           if there is any path in P reaching sink 
8          return true 
9     return false 
Figure 7. Algorithms Detecting Fake EOS Transfer 
The algorithm to detect Fake EOS Transfer is shown in Figure 
7. At line 2, WANA first checks whether the apply function is 
reachable. Then WANA further checks whether the apply 
function contains 3 64-bit integer parameters at line 3. The 3 64-
bit integer parameters correspond to the receiver, code, and action 
parameters. In lines 5, WANA performs symbolic execution 
within the apply function to find all feasible paths P where code 
is neither equal to eosio.token nor receiver. In line 6, WANA 
 6 
labels the wasm code invoking the transfer function as sink. 
Finally, it considers the contracts vulnerable if there are any paths 
in P reaching sink (line 7). Otherwise, the contract is not reported 
as vulnerable (line 8 to 9). 
WANA performs analysis on Wasm (i.e., binary format), but 
we use the WebAssembly text format (Wast) in the sequel of this 
section for ease of understanding. One possible Wast code pattern 
to compare the code parameter with eosio.token is shown in 
Figure 8. At line 3, the Wast code pushes $p1 (which represents 
the parameter code) to the stack. Then the Wast code pushes the 
64-bit integer corresponding to eosio.token to the stack (line 5). 
Then, the code and eosio.token are compared at line 6. Line 7 
represents the control flow branch when they are unequal and 
lines 9 to 11 represent the control flow segment when they are 
equal. The code paths in Figure 8 where code is not equal to 
eosio.token can be automatically identified during symbolic 
execution by adding the path constraint at the start: $p1 != 
encoding(“eosio.token”). 
1 … 
2 block $B2 
3   local.get $p1 //$p1 is code 
4 //6138663591592764928 is i64 encoding of eosio.token 
5   i64.const 6138663591592764928 //eosio.token 
6   i64.ne 
7   br_if $B2  //jump if not equal to eosio.token 
8   // branch where code equals to eosio.token 
9   i32.const 0   
10   local.set $l4 
11   br $B1 
12 end 
Figure 8. WAST Code Comparing Code and eosio.token 
 
The Wast code identifying the invocation of the transfer 
function is shown in Figure 9. At lines 2 to 5, the Wast code 
compares the action parameter with transfer. Note that “$p2” 
represents the action parameter and the 64-bit integer at line 4 
represents transfer. If the action equals to transfer (line 7), the 
Wast code will make preparations and call the transfer function 
(line 8 to 11). When detecting Fake EOS Transfer vulnerability, 
WANA uses the code pattern in Figure 9 to locate the code 
invoking transfer function (i.e., a sink). 
1  … 
2 local.get $p2 
3 //-3617168760277827584 is the i64 encoding of transfer 
4 i64.const -3617168760277827584   
5 i64.ne   
6 br_if $B10  //jump if not equal to transfer 
7 //equal to transfer, so preparing the invocation of transfer 
8 local.get $l3 
9 i32.const 0 
10 ... 
11 call $f162 //invoking transfer  
Figure 9. WAST Code Comparing Action and Invoking Transfer 
 
Forged Transfer Notification. When a smart contract 
receives a transfer notification, if it fails to check the destination 
(i.e., data.to) of EOS transfer is itself within its transfer function, 
a Forged Transfer Notification occurs.  
The algorithm to detect Forged Transfer Notification is shown 
in Figure 10. At line 2, WANA first performs concrete execution 
on the apply function with the action and code parameters fixed 
to transfer and eosio.token, respectively. The goal of concrete 
execution is to locate the position of the transfer function. During 
the concrete execution, if the Wasm instruction call_indirect is 
executed, WANA will consider the transfer function reachable 
(line 3). This is because the call_indirect is used in Wasm of 
EOSIO smart contract to invoke ABI functions and the action 
parameter is fixed to transfer at the start. The call_indirect 
instruction will pop a 32-bit integer as index into a table storing 
function addresses to get the address of the transfer function in 
Wasm. Then WANA will record the position of the transfer 
function within Wasm for follow-up analysis (line 4). 
1 bool isForgedTransferNotification() { 
2 concrete execution of apply with action fixed to transfer and code equals to eosio.token. 
3       if transfer function is reachable:  
4          label the position pt of transfer function in Wasm  
5          label the variables or stack storing _self in transfer 
6          label the Wasm comparing _self and to in transfer as C 
7          symbolically executing the transfer function at pt 
8      if there is any path reaching C 
9            return false 
10          else  
11 return true 
Figure 10. Algorithms Detecting Forged Transfer Notification 
From lines 5 to 11, the WANA analyzes the Wasm bytecode 
of the function transfer. At line 5, WANA first labels the set of 
variables storing _self, which is usually read from $p0 (the first 
parameter of transfer) and stored in local variables or the stack. 
Then it continues to label the Wasm bytecode comparing _self (in 
local variables or stack) with to as C (line 6). The “to” can be read 
from $p2 (the third parameter of transfer) or from the action data 
returned by unpack_action_data(). Finally, WANA performs 
symbolic execution within the transfer function to traverse all 
possible paths starting from pt (line 7). If there is any path 
reaching C during symbolic execution, the smart contract is 
considered not vulnerable (line 8 and 9). If there is no path 
reaching C, the smart contract is considered containing Forged 
Transfer Notification vulnerability (line 11). 
Block Information Dependency. The algorithm to detect 
Block Information Dependency vulnerability is relatively straight 
forward and we will use the Wast representation for illustration. 
WANA first checks whether there is any invocation of the 
$env.tapos_block_prefix or $env.tapos_block_num functions to 
get the block information through static analysis. Then WANA 
further checks whether there are invocations to the 
 $env.send_inline or $env.send_deferred functions to send EOS 
within the smart contract under analysis. Both the positions for 
collecting block information and for sending EOS are labelled 
during analysis. Finally, WANA performs symbolic execution to 
check whether there is at least one feasible path from the block 
information collection to the transfer of EOS. If there is one or 
more such feasible paths, the contract is reported to have Block 
Information Dependency vulnerability. 
4.3.2 Vulnerability Detection for Ethereum Smart Contracts  
In this section, we will present the algorithms to detect the 
Greedy, Dangerous DelegateCall, and Block Information 
Dependency vulnerabilities in Ethereum smart contracts. For ease 
of understanding, we will also use the function names in the Wast 
representation to describe the vulnerability detection algorithm in 
this section. In Wasm, each function name corresponds to a 32-
bit integer. The mapping between the function name and the 32-
bit integer can be collected during smart contract loading within 
the symbolic execution engine.  
Greedy. If an Ethereum smart contract can receive Ether but 
cannot send Ether, it is considered greedy. A greedy smart 
contract will freeze any Ether it has received.  
To check whether an Ethereum smart contract can receive 
Ether, WANA checks whether there is at least one payable 
function reachable from the main function. WANA counts the 
total number of functions and the number of non-payable 
functions to calculate the number of payable functions. In 
particular, a non-payable function in Ethereum will use 
$ethereum.getCallValue to initialize, which is easy to identify.  
To check that a smart contract cannot send Ether, WANA first 
checks whether there are any $ethereum.call functions within the 
bytecode of the smart contract. If there is not any $ethereum.call 
function within the bytecode of the smart contract, the contract 
cannot send any Ether. However, if there are some $ethereum.call 
functions, WANA will further check whether there is any feasible 
path from the main function to any of the $ethereum.call 
functions through symbolic execution. If there is no feasible path 
to any of them, the contract also cannot send any Ether. 
Dangerous DelegateCall. To detect the Dangerous 
DelegateCall vulnerability, WANA checks whether the 
invocation of DelegateCall() function (i.e., 
$ethereum.callDelegate in the Wast) is reachable from the entry 
function and whether the input parameter specifying the function 
called by DelegateCall() is manipulatable by an attacking 
contract. To determine whether the function invoked is 
manipulatable, WANA checks whether the first argument (i.e., 
the function to invoke) of $ethereum.callDelegate is a constant 
value. If it is not a constant value, a vulnerability is detected.  
Block Information Dependency. The detection of Block 
Information Dependency vulnerability for Ethereum smart 
contract is similar to that of the EOSIO smart contract. WANA 
also checks the existence of at least one feasible path from the 
block information collection to Ether transfer based on symbolic 
execution. The only difference lies in the implementation details. 
In Ethereum, the block information collection functions are 
$ethereum.getBlockNumber, $ethereum.getBlockTimestamp and 
$ethereum.getBlockHash, and the Ether transfer function is 
$ethereum.call.  
5 Experiment on EOSIO Smart Contract 
Vulnerability Detection 
In this section, we will present our experiment on EOSIO smart 
contract detection with WANA. 
5.1 Research Questions 
RQ1: Is WANA effective to detect the vulnerabilities within 
smart contracts? 
RQ2: Is WANA efficient to detect the vulnerabilities within smart 
contracts? 
5.2 Subject Programs 
We collected 83 smart contracts with source code and 3881 
smart contracts without source code for evaluation. The 83 smart 
contracts were downloaded from open source platforms. And the 
3881 smart contracts were downloaded from distinct EOSIO 
accounts in EOSPark [26] and EOS Jungle [26] in September, 
2019. The 3881 smart contracts accounted for a large percentage 
of contracts in distinct EOSIO accounts on the two websites. 
5.3 Experiment Setup 
We used a desktop PC as our experiment environment. The 
PC was running Ubuntu 18.04 and was equipped with Intel i7-
6700 8-core CPU and 16GB of memory. The WANA tool was 
implemented by Python3 and we used the official Python release 
version 3.7. Finally, WANA used the z3 version 4.8.0 as the 
constraint solver. The default loop depth of WANA was set as 10 
in the experiment. 
5.4 Effectiveness of WANA 
In this section, we present evaluation results to answer RQ1. 
Table 1. Vulnerability Detection Results on EOSIO Smart Contract 
with Source Code 
Vulnerability Total WANA Reported FP FN 
Block Information Dependency 83 3 0 0 
Forged Transfer Notification 83 5 0 0 
Fake EOS Transfer 83 2 0 0 
 
Results on smart contracts with source code. The 
vulnerability detection results on EOSIO smart contracts with 
source code are shown in Table 1. We can see that among the 83 
smart contracts, WANA reported 3 smart contracts with Block 
Information Dependency, 5 smart contracts with Forged Transfer 
Notification, and 2 smart contracts with Fake EOS Transfer. After 
manual checking the source code of the smart contracts, we 
confirmed that there were no false positives or false negatives for 
the 3 types of vulnerabilities by WANA in these 83 contracts. 
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Therefore, WANA is effective to detect vulnerabilities in EOSIO 
smart contracts with high accuracy in the experiment. 
Results on smart contracts without source code. We further 
evaluated WANA on smart contracts without source code, the 
results are shown in Table 2.  We can see that among the 3881 
smart contracts, WANA has detected 1 Block Information 
Dependency vulnerability, 202 Forged Transfer Notification 
vulnerabilities, and 201 Fake EOS Transfer vulnerabilities. 
Among the 3881 smart contracts, the percentage of Block 
Information Dependency, Forged Transfer Notification, and Fake 
EOS Transfer are 0.026%, 5.2%, and 5.18%, respectively.  
It is hard to manually verify those reported vulnerable smart 
contracts to calculate the precise number of false positives and 
false negatives. But the results give us an estimation of the 
number of vulnerable smart contracts deployed in the EOSIO 
platform in the wild. Given the relatively large percentages of 
Forged Transfer Notification and Fake EOS Transfer 
vulnerabilities, the developers are strongly recommended to 
perform security checks and harden their contract before releasing 
their EOSIO smart contracts. 
Table 2. Vulnerability Detection Effectiveness on EOSIO Smart 
Contracts without Source Code 
Vulnerability Total Vulnerabilities Detected Percentage 
Block Information 
Dependency 3881 1 0.026% 
Forged Transfer 
Notification 3881 202 5.20% 
Fake EOS Transfer 3881 201 5.18% 
 
5.5 Efficiency of WANA 
In this section, we further analyze the vulnerability detection 
efficiency of WANA to answer RQ2. When the loop depth of 
WANA is set as 10 (default value), the smart contract analysis 
time is shown in Figure 11.  
 
Figure 11. Smart Contract Analysis Time of WANA 
Note the x-axis represents the 3881 smart contracts under 
analysis and the y-axis represents the analysis time for the 
corresponding smart contract. We can see that the smart contract 
analysis times range from 0.1 second to 1.6 second, which are 
quite practical. The average smart contract analysis time for 
EOSIO smart contract is 0.21 second. We further increased the 
loop count to 20 and 50, and the smart contract analysis times 
were all within 2 seconds. Therefore, WANA is efficient enough 
to perform vulnerability analysis on EOSIO smart contract for 
practical use.  
6 Case Studies on Ethereum Smart Contracts 
Vulnerability Detection 
In this section, we perform a case study on the detection of 
vulnerabilities for Ethereum smart contracts.  
At the time of writing, the official support of Wasm in 
Ethereum is still under active development. As a result, there is 
no official toolchain to generate Wasm bytecode from Solidity or 
from EVM bytecode right now. But there are indeed ongoing 
projects working on Solidity-to-Wasm compilers. After manual 
checking, we found the SOLL compiler [38] is the only usable 
compiler, which can generate EWasm (Ethereum flavored 
WebAssembly) from Solidity and Yul.  
However, the SOLL compiler still does not support library 
declaration, modifier declaration, multiple classes, contract 
inheritance, constructor with parameter, return multiple value, 
and Inline assembly at the time of our case study. Therefore, most 
of the Ethereum smart contracts cannot be successfully compiled 
into EWasm yet. We tried to compile around 15,000 Ethereum 
smart contracts with SOLL, but only less than 10 of them can be 
successfully compiled to Wasm. As a result, we cannot 
comprehensively evaluate WANA on a large number of Ethereum 
smart contracts. Therefore, we chose to manually modify a few 
typical vulnerable Ethereum smart contracts by removing 
unsupported features such that they can be supported by SOLL 
(without affecting their semantics and vulnerable behavior). Then 
we used these modified smart contracts to evaluate WANA. 
Table 3. Ethereum Smart Contract Used in Case Study 
Vulnerability Smart Contract Name 
Greedy 
Luck 
SaveData 
ShowNum 
TestRegistry 
whoDepositV3 
Dangerous DelegateCall 
AdminInterface 
Delegatecall 
Router 
TransferReg 
Block Information Dependency 
AnyChicken 
EthMashMount 
Faucet 
TheOneToken 
6.1 Ethereum Smart Contracts Used in Case Study 
We chose Ethereum smart contracts with 3 typical 
vulnerabilities supported by WANA to perform the case study: 
0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
2
0
20
0
40
0
60
0
80
0
10
00
12
00
14
00
16
00
18
00
20
00
22
00
24
00
26
00
28
00
30
00
32
00
34
00
36
00
38
00
An
al
ys
is
 T
im
e 
(s
ec
on
d)
EOSIO Smart Contracts
 Greedy, Dangerous DelegateCall, and Block Information 
Dependency. To make them usable with the version of SOLL at 
the time of writing (version 0.0.5), we manually modified the 
source code of each smart contract to remove unsupported syntax 
features. As shown in Table 3, we selected and modified 5 Greedy 
smart contracts, 4 Dangerous DelegateCall smart contracts, and 4 
Block Information Dependency smart contracts for our case study. 
6.2 Setup of the Case Study 
We used the same desktop as in the experiment for EOSIO 
smart contract analysis to perform the case study. The desktop 
was installed with Ubuntu 18.04 as operating system. We used 
the SOLL version 0.0.5 to compile Ethereum smart contract to 
EWasm. And SOLL depended on llvm version 8.0. 
When generating EWasm from Solidity, the SOLL compiler 
first analyzed the Solidity code to generate the LLVM IR 
(Intermediate Representation). Then the SOLL compiler 
continued to generate the EWasm bytecode from the LLVM IR. 
During our case study, we used WANA to analyze the EWasm 
bytecode to report any vulnerabilities. 
6.3 Results and Analysis  
The vulnerability detection results on Ethereum smart 
contracts are shown in Table 4. We can see that WANA has 
successfully identified all vulnerable smart contracts for each type 
of vulnerability. WANA produced no false negative cases in the 
case study. Due to poor compiler support at the current stage, we 
still cannot perform large scale experiment to comprehensively 
evaluate the accuracy of WANA on Ethereum smart contracts, 
which we left as a future work. 
Table 4. Vulnerability Detection Results on                           
Ethereum Smart Contract 
Vulnerability 
WANA 
Total Reported 
Greedy 5 5 
Dangerous DelegateCall 4 4 
Block Information Dependency 4 4 
 
We have also measured the efficiency of WANA on Ethereum 
smart contract. The smart contract analysis times ranged from 
0.01 second to 0.53 second and the average smart contract 
analysis time was 0.08 second per smart contract. The results 
show that WANA is also efficient for analyzing Ethereum smart 
contracts. 
7 Mounting Attacks on Vulnerable Smart 
Contracts 
In this section, we manually mounted attacks on vulnerable 
EOSIO smart contracts detected by WANA. 
7.1. Attacks on EOSIO Smart Contracts with 
Source Code 
A previous version of eosbetcasino contract contained a Fake 
EOS Transfer vulnerability. And the contract was reported by 
WANA as vulnerable. We renamed the contract as 
eosbetcasinopre to differentiate it with other versions. Then we 
deployed and initialized the smart contract before mounting the 
attack. 
We used an agent contract to perform the attack. The agent 
contract contained a function fake, which performed an inline call 
to the transfer function of eosbetcasinopre. The attack procedure 
mainly involved 3 steps: 
In the first step, we invoked the function fake of the agent 
contract with cleos, which performed an inline call to the transfer 
function of the eosbetcasinopre to fake a bet. 
$ cleos push action agent fake [] -p agent@active 
In the second step, we queried the bet table of eosbetcasinopre 
to get the id of the current active bet. And a bet id value 
14796464400348548551 was returned. In another word, we had 
successfully made a bet without paying any EOS.  
$ cleos get table eosbetcasinopre eosbetcasinopre activebets 
In the third step, we called the refundbet ABI function of 
eosbetcasinopre with the active bet id to get a refund before the 
bet was resolved. In reality, an attacker could choose to wait for 
the bet to resolve in the hope of winning a prize. In this attack, we 
asked for a refund to ensure the profit was locked in. Finally, we 
found the fakeTransfer account got a refund of 2.0 EOS but it paid 
nothing before.  
$ cleos push action eosbetcasinopre refundbet 
[14796464400348548551] -p eosbetcasinopre@random 
7.2 Attacks on EOSIO Smart Contracts without 
Source Code 
The smart contract pvpgamesrock was reported by WANA to 
contain a Fake EOS Transfer vulnerability, so we proceeded to 
manually mount attacks on it.  
First, we initiated an attack to call the fake function of the 
agent contract, which in turn made an inline call to the transfer 
function of the smart contract pvpgamesrock.  
$ cleos push action agent fake [] -p agent@active -f  
At first, we used a random value of EOS and memo strings to 
perform the inline call. However, the transaction was aborted and 
rolled back. Then we analyzed the strings referenced within the 
transfer function of pvpgamesrock through bytecode analysis and 
found the magic memo string “malloc_from_freed was designed 
to only be called after _heap was completely allocated” defined 
in the data area. Finally, we performed an inline call through the 
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agent contract with the magic memo string to successfully made 
a bet without spending EOS. The parameters for the successful 
inline call was as follows: 
["agent", "pvpgamesrock", "536.0402 EOS", 
"malloc_from_freed was designed to only be called after _heap 
was completely allocated"] 
Then, we further called the expireforce function of 
pvpgamesrock to finish the attack by asking for a refund. We tried 
several strings for the parameter server_str, and we found any 
string starting with letter “f” worked. Therefore, we used the 
string “fire” to finish the attack. Finally, the smart pvpgamesrock 
transferred 536.0402 EOS as refund to our agent contract, who in 
fact spent no EOS to make the bet.  
$ cleos push action pvpgamesrock expireforce '{"server_str": 
"fire"}' -p pvpgamesrock@active -f  
8 Related Work 
In this section, we present closely related work on smart 
contract vulnerability detection.  
Atzei et al. [2] performed a comprehensive survey on 
vulnerabilities and attacks on Ethereum smart contracts. Parizi et 
al. [17] performed an experimental evaluation of current 
Ethereum smart contracts security testing tools. Chen et al. [5] 
proposed the TokenScope tool, which could analyze the 
transaction traces from Ethereum to automatically check whether 
the behaviors of the token contracts are consistent with the ERC–
20 standards.   
There are several works on the formal verification of smart 
contracts. Abdellatif and Brousmiche [1] proposed a formal 
modeling approach to verify the behavior of smart contract in its 
execution environment. They further performed security analysis 
on the smart contracts with a statistical model checking approach. 
Hirai [7] used Isabelle/HOL tool to verify the smart contract Deed, 
which was part of the Ethereum Name Service implementation.  
Fuzzing is also an effective approach for vulnerability 
detection. Jiang et al. proposed ContractFuzzer [8], a black-box 
fuzzer for detecting vulnerabilities in Ethereum smart contracts. 
They also proposed the test oracles for detecting 7 typical 
Ethereum smart contract vulnerabilities. Nguyen et al. proposed a 
grey-box fuzzing tool called sFuzz [15] for smart contract 
vulnerability detection. The sFuzz tool adopts a lightweight 
multi-objective adaptive strategy to cover those hard-to-cover 
branches.  
Symbolic execution [3][9] is a popular technique for 
vulnerability detection. There are several symbolic execution 
tools for security analysis of Ethereum smart contracts. Luu et al 
[11] proposed the Oyente symbolic verification tool for Ethereum 
smart contract. Oyente first builds the control-flow graph of smart 
contracts and then performs symbolic execution on the graph to 
check code patterns corresponding to smart contract 
vulnerabilities. Nikolic et al. [16] designed MAIAN, another 
symbolic execution tool to analyze the execution traces of 
Ethereum smart contracts. MAIAN characterizes the tracing 
properties of three typical smart contract vulnerabilities. And it 
can detect the greedy, the prodigal and the suicidal contracts in a 
scalable manner. Tsankov et al. proposed the Securify tool to 
detect Ethereum smart contract vulnerabilities. The Securify tool 
[19] first symbolically analyzes the contract's dependency graph 
to extract precise semantic information from the code. Then, it 
checks compliance and violation patterns that capture sufficient 
conditions for proving if a property holds or not. 
Jhannes Krupp [10] proposed TETHER, a tool that 
automatically generates an exploit for an Ethereum smart contract 
given only its binary bytecode through symbolic execution. They 
also proposed an approach to handle hash values symbolically, 
which are used extensively in smart contracts.  
ConsenSys proposed the Mythril [6] security analysis tool for 
EVM bytecode. Mythril used symbolic execution, SMT solving 
and taint analysis detect a variety of security vulnerabilities. 
Trailofbits proposed the Manticore [20] symbolic execution tool 
for dynamic binary analysis of smart contracts and Linux ELF 
binaries. Manticore combined symbolic execution, taint analysis, 
and instrumentation to analyze binaries. 
Wang et al. [21] proposed the VULTRON tool based on the 
observation that almost all the existing transaction-related 
vulnerabilities were due to the mismatch between the actual 
transferred amount and the amount reflected on the contract’s 
internal bookkeeping. The VULTRON tool provided a general 
test oracle that can be used to drive a range of smart contract 
analysis techniques. 
9 Conclusions and Future Work 
The popularity of blockchain and smart contract technologies 
has enabled the cooperation among parties with limited trust. 
However, the vulnerabilities within smart contract have caused 
financial loss to its end users. Due to the diversity of the 
blockchain and smart contract platforms, existing vulnerability 
detection tools for smart contracts are generally platform specific. 
We observe that the smart contracts on both the EOSIO 
blockchain platform and the Ethereum blockchain platform will 
rely on WebAssembly VM for execution, which provides a 
common basis for building cross-platform smart contract 
vulnerability detection tools. 
In this work, we proposed WANA, a symbolic execution 
engine for WebAssembly bytecode and a cross-platform smart 
contract vulnerability detection framework for both EOSIO and 
Ethereum smart contracts. The experiment and case studies on 
EOSIO and Ethereum smart contracts showed that WANA is 
effective and efficient to detect smart contract vulnerabilities.  
 The WebAssembly VM is also widely supported in Web 
browsers to support the development of Web application. 
Furthermore, the hardware-, language-, and platform-independent 
nature of WebAssembly also makes it popular for use in other 
environments. For future work, we plan to extend WANA to 
support the vulnerability detection of Web applications. We also 
plan to improve WANA to handle the symbolic analysis of 
external functions in a more accurate manner. 
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